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Abstract
In the shadow of rising divorce and non-marital birth rates, nearly two-
thirds of all American children today will live apart from at least one of
their parents, usually the father. Clearly this astonishing proportion of
non-resident fathers has serious implications for the economic,
employment, and educational status of mothers and the development
and wellbeing of children. But according to the authors of Fathers Under
Fire, a more comprehensive perspective on non-resident fathers –
understanding their capacities and circumstances, acknowledging their
responses to policy changes, and recognising their needs -- is essential in
order to derive value from the past twenty years of policy change, and to
design more effective policies for the future. Fathers Under Fire is
intended as a first step toward public policy that reflects the interests of
children, families, and society as a whole – by including the diverse
perspectives and potential of non-resident fathers.
The book traces the recent evolution of child support policy which
is shifting the burden of supporting children in single parent families
from the public and mothers to non-resident fathers. Fathers Under Fire
argues that, as yet, the shift has neither improved the standard of living
for mothers and children, nor helped the fathers to be able to meet their
obligations.
The authors explore the various “side effects” of rigorous
enforcement, especially for low-income fathers, finding that 1) a
“proportional standard” of support determination would improve
compliance without economically crippling those fathers who are
already hovering in or near poverty; 2) child support enforcement does
seem to reduce the likelihood of both remarriage and subsequent out-of-
wedlock births for low-income non-resident fathers; 3) payment of
support does tend to coincide (for better and worse) with seeing the
children more often, and having more influence in child-rearing
decisions.
Several research databases are used to analyse and identify
promising strategies to improve non-resident fathers’ access to their
children. The ethics of various approaches to child support – and the
moral complexity of the issues – are discussed by a legal theorist who
argues for a legislative process that is “informed by public attitudes and
beliefs” about family behaviour. In this spirit, another pair of authors
present the voices of fathers themselves, offering their perceptions of
vwhat the child support system values (and does not value), and the
shame, fear, and resentment that they experience within this system.
Beyond policy recommendations for stronger but more reasonable
enforcement; incentives for compliance, and strengthened access with
preventive services for fathers; the authors also identify several
limitations in research that must be remedied, including undercounting
or misclassification of a substantial portion of low-income, non-resident
fathers, lack of information about the characteristics of non-resident
fathers, and a paucity of longitudinal and couple data.
In sum, Fathers Under Fire attempts to widen the lens fixed on child
support enforcement as a public policy concern. Of course, the interests
of mothers and children figure prominently. But the image is only
complete if the fathers’ perspectives are also a part of the picture. While
the issue has often been cast in black and white – a purely private or
wholly public responsibility – this book finds the truth in subtler shades
of grey, where the two realms complement each other and “reinforce the
social norm that raising healthy and secure children is a shared
responsibility.”
11. Introduction
The Growing Importance of Non-resident Fathers
The American family has undergone a dramatic restructuring during the
past four decades. At the beginning of the 1950s, a large majority of
children in the United States lived with both of their biological parents
from the time they were born to the age of maturity. Only 33% percent
were expected to ever experience the loss of a biological parent
(Bumpass 1984). Today, the picture is dramatically different. Nearly 60%
of children will live apart from at least one of their parents, usually the
father1, before reaching adulthood (Bumpass and Sweet 1989)2. These
changes represent a fundamental shift in the living arrangements of both
children and parents.
Although a significant minority of children have lived apart from
their fathers throughout American history, what is truly new today is
the proportion of fathers who are living apart from their children. Up
until the 20th century, mortality rates were high, and many children lost
fathers as well as mothers through death. Uhlenberg (1980) estimates
that about 24 percent of children born in 1900 experienced the death of a
parent before reaching age 15. While mortality rates have declined
steadily throughout the twentieth century, divorce and out-of-wedlock
births have increased and both have skyrocketed since the 1960s,
dramatically altering the nature and prevalence of father absence.
Today’s absent fathers live apart from their children by choice -- their
own choice, the mother’s, or both. That children in single-mother
families have a living father who could contribute to their economic
support and upbringing has important implications for these families,
for the broader society and for fathers themselves.
                                          
1 The proportion of children in single-parent families who live with their
fathers rather than their mothers is only 15%, but has been growing (see
Garasky and Meyer, 1996).
2 Our estimate updates the Bumpass-Sweet estimates as follows. As of 1995,
one third of all births are non-marital births, but 40% of those are to
cohabiting couples, of whom 2/3 go on to marry. Assuming that 50% of these
married couples remain married, 4.4% (33% x 40% x 66% x 50% = 4.4%) of the
non-marital births will spend their childhood with both biological parents,
leaving 28.6% spending part of their childhood apart from one-parent.
Assuming that 45% of the 66% of children born to married parents will
experience divorce, suggests 29.7% of these children will experience
separation from one parent. Adding 29.7% to 28.6% yields a total of 58.3%.
2The change in the causes of father absence is just part of today’s
markedly different landscape. Significant, too, is the sheer growth in the
numbers of children who do not live with their fathers and who never
have lived with their fathers. In 1965, when Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan wrote his famous report, The Negro Family: The Case for
National Action, births outside marriage accounted for 5 percent of all
births and for 23 percent of all births to African-American women.
Today, the numbers are 30 percent and 70 percent, respectively.3 These
are sobering statistics.
The greater number of children living apart from their fathers has
important consequences for children, parents, and society at large. Half
of all children living in mother-only households have incomes below the
poverty line, and another quarter have incomes between the poverty
threshold and 200 percent of the poverty line (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1996, P60-194). Not surprisingly, in view of the high poverty rates of
single mother households, the increase in their numbers led to a
dramatic expansion of the welfare system (Garfinkel and McLanahan,
1986). The rise in single-parent families also has lasting consequences for
the social mobility of the next generation: growing up with a single
parent has been found to increase children’s risk of dropping out of high
school, becoming teen mothers, and finding themselves out of school
and out of steady work as young adults (McLanahan and Sandefur,
1994).
Fathers Under Fire
In response to the increase in divorce and non-marital childbearing, and
the resulting impact on public expenditures, poverty, and child welfare,
policy makers passed a series of laws aimed at forcing non-resident
fathers to provide more economic support for their children. In the mid
1970s, the federal government established the Office of Child Support
Enforcement and directed states to do the same. Twice in the 1980s,
major federal legislation was passed requiring states to strengthen
paternity establishment, to create legislative guidelines for setting child
support orders, and to withhold obligations from fathers’ wages. This
process continued into the 1990s, with child support enforcement being
a major component of the new welfare legislation -- the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act, 1996.
                                          
3 However, 25 percent of children born non-maritally are born to cohabiting
parents (Bumpass and Sweet, 1995), so these children do live with their
fathers for at least part of their lives.
3Coupled with the decline in the value of welfare benefits which occurred
over this same period, the child support legislation may be seen as an
attempt to privatise the cost of children and to shift some of the burden
from the state and from mothers onto the shoulders of fathers.
Non-resident fathers, as a consequence, face a very different, more
invasive, world. A man who parents a child outside marriage and denies
paternity can be required to take a blood or genetic test. The amount of
child support that all fathers must pay is increasingly determined by
government regulations. Their obligations are now often withheld from
their paycheques. Fathers who fail to pay may have their income tax
refunds and property seized and their drivers, professional, and trade
licenses revoked, and can no longer receive food stamps. The ultimate
sanction for non-payment continues to be jail time. It is no exaggeration,
therefore, to say that non-resident fathers are now under fire.
Non-resident fathers have become money objects. Fathers who fail
to pay child support are labelled “deadbeat dads” without regard to
other contributions they may be making to their children. Furthermore,
attention to the effects of child support enforcement on the fathers
themselves has been minimal. Until recently, researchers have made
little attempt to understand fathers in a broader perspective.4 What are
fathers capabilities and responsibilities? How do they react to stricter
enforcement? What are their needs and concerns?
Despite more than twenty years of intensifying legislation, child
support collections, on average, have not shown much improvement.
The lack of attention to the fathers coupled with the disappointing child
support record to date, suggests that it is time to re-appraise child
support enforcement policy by examining its impact on non-resident
fathers.
Three overarching questions must be addressed in this re-
appraisal. First, are the new child support policies consistent with the
capacities and circumstances of non-resident fathers? Second, do child
support policies have adverse unintended effects on the fathers? Finally,
should policy be reoriented to do more to assist non-resident fathers?
                                          
4 Making Fathers Pay by David Chambers is an early notable exception (1979).
For more recent exceptions see Nichols-Casebolt (1986), Haskins (1988),
Braver et. al. (1991), Lerman and Ooms (1993), Sullivan (1993), Seltzer and
Bandreth (1995), Sorenson (1997) and Sorenson and Mincy (1998).
4The Questions Addressed
What are the policies and are they consistent with fathers’ capabilities?
In order to assess the effects of the new child support system on fathers,
we must first understand the different components of the legislation,
how they have evolved over time, and the extent to which they are being
implemented throughout the country. Although the federal government
has been pushing the states to strengthen their child support
enforcement systems for over twenty years, federal authority is
relatively weak. When it comes to family matters, federal officials must
rely on incentives and moral persuasion to move states in the direction
they would have them go. Hence, at any point in time, there is
enormous variation across the states with respect to their political will
and their capacity (both financial and managerial) to enforce child
support obligations. Equally important, although the federal legislation
is universal in word, in practice states have a strong incentive to treat
different groups of fathers differently. On the one hand, collecting
support from low-income fathers is much harder than collecting from
middle income fathers, so the child support agency’s performance will
look better to the extent that it focuses on middle income fathers. On the
other hand, pursuing the fathers of children on welfare is likely to
reduce welfare costs, whereas pursuing middle- and upper- income
fathers has no such benefit. Moreover, whereas reducing welfare costs is
politically popular, pursuing middle- and upper-income fathers is less
acceptable to the electorate. Indeed, fathers with financial resources are
well organised and have been waging strong campaigns in state
legislatures throughout the country to protect their rights and lower
their financial obligations.
Unfortunately, although we know a great deal about single
mothers and their children5, we know comparatively little about non-
resident fathers. And we know even less about non-resident fathers at
the bottom of the income distribution. In part, our ignorance is due to
the fact that we are dealing with a relatively new phenomenon and we
lack good data on these men. Many non-resident fathers are missing
from our social surveys, and others do not want to be identified and
therefore misreport their status. In part, our ignorance may be due to the
fact that we, as a society, care more about the status of children, whom
                                          
5 See, for example, Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986; Ross and Sawhill 1975;
Kamerman and Kahn, 1988; Cherlin and Furstenberg and Harris 1993; and
Seltzer 1994.
5we see as having little control over their lives, than adults, whom we
view as, by and large, “getting what they deserve.”
The need for a better understanding of non-resident fathers goes
beyond intellectual curiosity. The knowledge gaps must be filled if social
scientists and policy-makers are to understand the effect of twenty years
of policy changes, to estimate the likely effectiveness of new changes on
the horizon, and to devise new measures that work. What are the lives
of the full spectrum of non-resident fathers like? How much income do
they have? With whom do they live? How does their situation compare
to that of resident fathers? To that of single mothers and children? How
do those fathers who fail to pay child support differ from fathers who
pay? What percent of these men are potentially dangerous or
undesirable as fathers? These questions are addressed in section 2 of this
paper.
What are the likely repercussions of stronger child support enforcement?
Since the mid-1970s, opponents of child support enforcement have
argued that forcing fathers to pay more child support will only
impoverish fathers’ new families and that the new laws are simply
“robbing Peter to pay Paul.” This critique has not been adequately
addressed because most research examines the benefits associated with
the receipt of increased child support payments but does not look at the
costs associated with the payment of child support dollars.6
Other critics worry that strong child support enforcement may
discourage non-resident fathers from marrying and starting new
families, and, in particular, from marrying single mothers with children.
There is evidence, though still controversial, that marriage has several
benefits for men, including decreased mortality, lower alcohol use and
higher earnings (Akerlof, 1998; Waite, 1995). Certainly, marriage or
cohabitation with a single mother increases the standard of living of the
mother and child. Indeed, twenty five years ago, when the growth of
single motherhood was first becoming apparent, many people believed
that the best solution to the economic problems of these families was
remarriage which, in those days, was quite common (Ross and Sawhill,
1975).
Still other critics worry that stronger enforcement will have the
unintended effect of reducing fathers’ work effort or forcing them into
the underground economy. If this were true, everyone would be worse
off, including the fathers’ first family, his subsequent or current family
                                          
 
6 For an exception, see Nichols-Casebolt (1986).
6and the government, which would collect less taxes. Whether this fear is
well-founded depends in part on whether fathers see child support
obligations as a tax which may encourage them to work less or whether
they view it as a reduction in income which may encourage them to
work more.
Another concern is that stronger enforcement will increase contact
between the parents and possibly exacerbate conflict or violence. The
latter would undoubtedly be harmful to children. Fathers who pay child
support see their children more often than fathers who do not pay, and
one might expect that new fathers who are brought into the system will
follow suit. Because greater contact increases the opportunity for
conflict, and because these men may have strong feelings about not
paying support, the risk of conflict would seem to be high in these
families. This problem may be especially acute in low-income families
where the mother is receiving welfare and where the child support
dollars go toward reducing welfare costs rather than to the child. In
response to the new welfare legislation, many advocates for women and
children have presented numbers suggesting that a large proportion of
welfare mothers have been exposed to domestic violence in the past,
including data linking violence to disputes over child support (Allard, et
al. 1997; Raphael and Tolman, 1997). Thus the answer to this question
has important implications not only for child support policy but for
welfare policy more generally.
Stronger child support enforcement may have benefits as well as
costs. First, strengthening fathers’ obligations to children is likely to also
strengthen their rights to be involved with their child. As noted above,
fathers who pay child support are more likely to spend time with their
child and help make decisions about how their child is raised (Seltzer,
1991). When parents get along, more contact with the father and greater
father involvement is likely to have benefits for the child (Amato and
Rezac, 1994; Hetherington, Cox, and Cox, 1982). Second, stronger child
support enforcement may have an important deterrence effect on non-
marital fertility. Once young men realise that fathering a child incurs a
financial obligation, lasting for up to 18 years, they may take more
precautions to avoid an unintended pregnancy. We know that the vast
majority of non-marital births are due to unintended pregnancies
(Brown and Eisenberg, 1995). We also know that women bear most of
the responsibility for contraception. Thus, if fathers were to change their
behaviours in this regard, the number of unintended pregnancies would
likely decline as would the number of non-marital births.
7Section 3 of this paper summarises evidence on the effects of
stronger child support enforcement on non-resident father’s income,
employment, marriage, fertility, and relationships with their child’s
mother.
Should we be doing more for non-resident fathers?
A final question we address is whether society should be doing more to
help non-resident fathers meet their obligations and assert their parental
rights. Until recently, fathers in general have been viewed primarily as
breadwinners, and child support policies have incorporated this rather
limited view. Non-resident fathers have been treated more or less as
objects from which money can be extracted, and little thought has been
given to their rights, as fathers, or to how we might help them meet their
obligations, both financial and otherwise.
Perhaps the most frequently expressed concern of fathers is that
they are denied access to their children. When child support
enforcement was lax, non-resident fathers had the option of trading
child support for access to their child. As enforcement has become more
rigorous, non-resident fathers have relatively less bargaining power, and
therefore they have been lobbying for government to enforce their
visitation rights. In response, several demonstration programmes which
seek to improve fathers’ access to their children, have been funded in
different parts of the country.
Another concern of fathers and their advocates is that many men
are unable to meet their financial obligations and need help in gaining
jobs and job skills. Again, the federal government has responded to their
concerns by funding demonstrations in several states. The Parents Fair
Share programmes provide employment and training services, peer
group support, counselling, and assistance in establishing paternity and
child support orders, and, if necessary, help in arranging mediation
between the father and his child’s mother. The programmes also help
fathers obtain temporary reductions in their child support obligations
while they are in the programme.
Answering the question of whether or not government should be
supporting the kinds of programmes described above, means knowing
whether these programmes actually work. If they do not work,
supporting them would simply be wasting the taxpayer’s money,
regardless of their appeal. Answering the should question also means
stepping back from the practical problems and reassessing the basic
premise underlying the child support policies that have been legislated
during the past twenty years. Basically, these policies treat all fathers
8alike in terms of holding them financially responsible for their biological
children. No exceptions are made for fathers who are very poor, and no
exceptions are made for fathers who are supporting new families. Is this
appropriate? Section 4 of this paper addresses these questions of
whether we should be doing more to help fathers.
A Special Focus on Low-income Fathers
A theme running through the evidence discussed here is an interest in
and concern for low-income fathers. Most discussions today assume that
non-resident fathers are a homogeneous group, at least in terms of their
ability to provide for their children. Hence the term “deadbeat dad” is
applied rather indiscriminately to all non-paying fathers. In truth, the
reasons for failing to pay child support may be very different, ranging
from poor fathers who are doing all they can to very wealthy fathers
who are, as the term “deadbeat dad” suggests, shirking their
responsibilities.
Whether a father is poor also affects his experiences with the child
support system. Although universal in principle, in practice, the new
child support laws treats fathers from different income strata differently.
Whereas middle- and upper-income fathers usually negotiate their child
support agreements in private and with the services of a lawyer who
represents their interests, poor fathers often find themselves without
counsel and confronted by public officials who represent the interests of
the state. The different treatment occurs in part because poor fathers
cannot afford a lawyer. Even more important, however, children of poor
fathers are likely to be on welfare and therefore state officials have a
much stronger incentive to collect child support payments as a way of
reducing welfare costs. Indeed middle-class mothers often report that
they have a hard time getting state agencies to help them collect unpaid
child support since the money goes to the mother rather than to the
state.7
                                          
7 Some evidence is provided by court cases. Carter v. Morrow, 526 F. Supp.
1225 (W.D.N.C. 1981) non-welfare mothers sued the state of North Carolina to
get child support services comparable to those being provided to welfare
mothers. In Clay v Austin, Civ. No. 85-86 (E.D. KY. 1986) the state of
Kentucky was sued because it would not do modifications of awards for non-
welfare mothers. We also have very recent anecdotal evidence from a number
of personal acquaintances in different states which document the
unwillingness of the child support offices in these states to provide services to
mothers who are not on welfare. Finally, CPS data indicates a big increase in
9Finally, we might expect low-income fathers to respond differently to
stronger child support enforcement, in part because they are less able to
meet their obligations, in part because their contributions are less likely
to go directly to their child, and in part because of differences in social
norms regarding the obligations of fathers who never were married to
their child’s mother. Although non-marital childbearing occurs among
all social classes, low-income fathers are less likely to marry than fathers
from other income strata. To make sure that we would have information
on poor fathers, we asked each of the authors to look not only at non-
resident fathers in general, but also at poor non-resident fathers in
particular. Thus, each of the analyses in this paper contains information
that will improve our understanding of the conditions and response of
poor non-resident fathers.
A Conference on Non-resident Fathers
To answer the questions we have posed, the authors of this paper, with
funding from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and
the Russell Sage Foundation, commissioned a large group of social
scientists and a small group of legal scholars to write and discuss a set of
papers. The papers were subjected to written criticism by two formal
discussants and to open discussion by all participants at a conference
held on September 14-16, 1995 at Princeton University. The papers were
revised in light of the criticisms and suggestions of discussants, outside
reviewers commissioned by the Russell Sage Foundation, and the
editors and will be presented in the book entitled Fathers Under Fire: The
revolution in child support enforcement. Two teams of authors were asked
to write about the policies and the fathers’ capabilities. Their papers are
summarised in section 2. Five were asked to examine the possible side
effects of stronger child support enforcement, and their papers are
summarised in section 3. Finally, three were asked to address the,
“Should we do more?” question, and their papers are summarised in
section 4. In the final section, we revisit the original questions and make
policy recommendations, using evidence from the ten papers in the
volume.
                                                                                                                                  
the proportion of AFDC cases with child support payments over time, but no
comparable increase for non-AFDC cases.
10
2. What are the Policies and Who are the Fathers?
This section summarises evidence on whether our current child support
policies are consistent with fathers’ capabilities and responsibilities.
A Brief History of Social Policies For Non-resident Fathers
Prior to the 1940s, the vast majority of single mothers were widows, and
thus it made sense that protecting these mothers and children from
poverty and economic insecurity was a public responsibility. After 1960,
however, in response to soaring divorce and out-of-wedlock birth rates
and rising public expenditures, policy makers began to reassess their
former policies and to try to shift more of the costs of supporting single
mothers and their children from the state to non-resident fathers. Since
the mid 1970s, the federal government has passed a series of laws aimed
at increasing the proportion of eligible children with a child support
order, increasing (and standardising order levels), and increasing
collection rates. The authors describe these legislative changes and
examine their possible effects on trends in federal and state child
support statistics. They find that the aggregate trends show little
improvement during the 1980s, suggesting that the new legislation has
been unsuccessful in the short-term. However, a more careful look at the
trends suggests considerable improvement in both collections and order
rates. Paternity establishment rates have risen dramatically, and there is
some evidence that particular policies such as guidelines and income
withholding are working in some states.
What is worrisome about these statistics is that child support
enforcement agencies are targeting low-income fathers to try to offset
public expenditures, such as AFDC and other welfare programmes, on
children with single mothers. Thus, the increase in orders and
collections may be occurring among men at the bottom end of the
income distribution who can least afford to meet these obligations. Most
of the child support dollars coming into the system as a result of
increased enforcement among low-income fathers go toward reducing
welfare costs rather than toward increasing the living standards of single
mothers and their children.8 Finally, very little money is being spent on
                                          
8 Of the $2.9 billion collected for AFDC families in 1996, .5 billion went to
families through the disregard and the rest went to offset public costs (U.S.
Health and Human Services 1997). For several reasons, these figures
underestimate the proportion of the child support paid by low-income fathers
that goes to their children via the passthrough. First, child support collections
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programmes to help poor fathers meet their new obligations. The
chapter ends with a discussion of two such programmes that were
implemented in the 1990s: the Parent’s Fair Share programmes, which
were designed in improve fathers’ ability to pay support, and the Access
Demonstrations, which were designed to increase fathers’ access to their
children.
A Patchwork Portrait of Non-resident Fathers
Evaluating the effects of child support enforcement on non-resident
fathers requires a general understanding of fathers as well as their work
and family situations. Unfortunately, although we have a wealth of
information about single mothers and their children, we know very little
about non-resident fathers. One reason for this oversight is a lack of
good data. Many non-resident fathers are not represented in our
national surveys. Garfinkel, McLanahan, and Hanson use data from the
1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) and
several other sources, to adjust for the under-representation of non-
resident fathers and to provide a more accurate picture of non-resident
fathers’ resources and constraints. By using adjustment procedures that
provide a range of estimates, the authors recognise that reasonable
persons may disagree about how fathers who are missing from the
survey differ from those who are included and acknowledge paternity.
They find that non-resident fathers have less education and lower
wages than fathers who live with their children. They also find that non-
resident fathers are less likely to be in good health and more likely to
abuse alcohol and drugs than fathers who live with their children.
Not surprisingly, non-resident fathers, on average, have lower
incomes than resident fathers. The mean personal income for all non-
resident fathers ranges from about $26,900 to $33,400 (in 1995 $)
compared to $40,700 for resident fathers. These results are similar to
those in other studies of non-resident fathers’ incomes. To the extent that
the estimates are reasonably consistent across data sources and
techniques of compensating for non-resident fathers’ low rates of
participation in surveys, the results provide valuable information for
                                                                                                                                  
for AFDC cases are more likely to come from non-low-income fathers than
from low-income fathers. Second, collections from low-income fathers are
likely to be lower and therefore more likely to be passed through to the
mothers than collections from non-low-income fathers. Finally, in some cases
the mothers and children of low-income fathers will not be receiving welfare
and any child support collected from these fathers will go directly to the
mothers and children.
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assessing what non-resident fathers are able to contribute in child
support.
Consistent with claims that scarce economic resources are partly to
blame for the failure of non-resident fathers to pay child support, the
authors find that fathers who do not pay child support are even worse
off than fathers who pay.
Although non-resident fathers have less income than resident
fathers, after taking account of child support payments and the number
of people in their home, Garfinkel and his colleagues conclude that non-
resident fathers have roughly the same standard of living as resident
fathers. Both are substantially better off than resident mothers and their
children, more than 70 percent of whom are poor or near-poor.
These authors also examine non-resident fathers living
arrangements. They find that only a third of these men are supporting
new families that include children. The same is true for the subset of
fathers who pay no child support. These findings suggest that living
with other children may not be a significant cause of non-payment.
Only a small percentage of non-resident fathers have serious
alcohol or drug problems. But these problems appear to be more
common among non-resident fathers than among resident fathers.
Moreover, the proportion of fathers with problems is even higher among
men who do not pay child support. This pattern suggests that tougher
child support enforcement may bring more troubled fathers into the
system, but that these fathers would still comprise only a small
percentage of the whole. Garfinkel et al., however, are careful to note
that because substance abuse is likely to be underreported, the true
percentage could easily be much higher.
3. How Does Child Support Enforcement Affect Fathers?
The five papers summarised in this section investigate some potential
side effects of rigorous child support enforcement, paying particular
attention to whether heightened enforcement produces a different
reaction among low-income fathers, whose financial circumstances limit
their ability to pay child support, than among higher-income fathers.
The first paper summarised in this section examines whether stronger
enforcement is likely to reduce the standard of living and increase
poverty rates in fathers’ new families. The rest of the papers condensed
in this section investigate possible behavioural responses of non-resident
fathers, including whether stronger child support enforcement is likely
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to reduce fathers’ labour force participation and the number of hours
they work, whether it would reduce marriage and remarriage, whether
it would increase fathers’ involvement with their children and parental
conflict, and, whether it would reduce the rate of non-marital
childbearing. To assess the effects of stronger enforcement on fathers’
behaviour, the last papers use research designs which take advantage of
variations across states and time periods in the adoption and
implementation of child support enforcement policies.
The Economic Cost of Child Support Enforcement for Fathers and Their
Families
Daniel Meyer uses data from the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH) to describe the effect of child support enforcement
on non-resident fathers’ economic circumstances. He simulates the
effects of various child support guidelines and enforcement regimes on
fathers’ income and ability to help provide for their children.  He
estimates the number of fathers who would fall into poverty as a result
of paying child support, and how many more fathers would be poor if
all fathers paid their child support orders in full.
Meyer’s analysis uses data from a snapshot of fathers’ income and
family responsibilities and asks what would happen if fathers did not
change their behaviour in response to stricter child support enforcement
(that is, fathers do not increase their employment hours, avoid
remarriage, etc.). Like Garfinkel and his colleagues, Meyer takes account
of the under-representation of non-resident fathers in his data by
assuming that fathers who are not interviewed pay no child support. As
a result, Meyer presents a range of estimates of the effects of child
support enforcement on fathers’ economic welfare.
He shows that the amount of child support non-resident fathers
currently pay has little effect on the distribution of fathers’ incomes at
the lower end of the personal income distribution. Child support
payments do lower the median and 75th percentile of the distribution of
fathers’ incomes by about $2500 (1995 dollars) each. If all of current child
support orders were paid in full, the personal incomes of fathers at the
lower end of the income distribution would decrease further, but there
would be little effect on the upper end, because more of these fathers
already report paying all of the child support due. Non-resident fathers
with high incomes owe and pay more child support than fathers at the
lower end of the scale. However, fathers with low-incomes, as noted in
the previous section, have orders that are higher relative to their
incomes.
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Ignoring income spent on child support, between 14 and 24
percent of non-resident fathers have household incomes below the
poverty level. Meyer’s estimates (based on NSFH data) are quite similar
to those Sorenson (1997) reports using SIPP data. Poverty rates of fathers
whose children were born outside of marriage are higher than those of
divorced fathers. Once current child support payments are taken into
account, an additional 1 percent of non-resident fathers fall into poverty.
If all non-resident fathers paid the support due according to their orders,
up to .4 percent would fall into poverty. Meyer shows that a
proportional standard for child support orders would reduce economic
hardship among poor fathers compared to orders established under the
system current at the time of the NSFH survey. A proportional system
would also reduce the economic advantage that fathers with high or
moderate incomes experience compared to fathers with low-incomes.
Although his data cannot assess the effect of child support on the
magnitude of the trade-off between creating poverty among non-
resident fathers’ new families and alleviating poverty in resident
mothers’ families, Meyer concludes that a guideline that ignores self-
support and economic claims of new families, would not result in a big
reshuffling of poverty among children, even if enforcement of child
support awards were perfect. His findings about the varying effects of
adjustments for self-support, household income, and second families
inform a normative assessment of the competing interests of non-
resident fathers, children from first and subsequent relationships, and
resident mothers, issues we address in the third section of this volume.
Child Support Enforcement and Employment of Non Resident Fathers
Freeman and Waldfogel ask how more rigorous child support
enforcement will alter non-resident fathers’ labour force participation
and employment patterns. Anticipating the effects of child support
enforcement on fathers’ labour activity is crucial for understanding the
effects of child support policies on non-resident fathers’ economic
welfare and on the welfare of their children. The authors contrast two
scenarios: Under the first, more common scenario, child support
payments are a fixed amount that the non-resident father owes for an
extended period of time. In this case, enforcement will reduce the
father’s income, but will have no effect on the marginal value of an
additional hour of work. To make up for the loss in income, the father is
expected to increase the amount of paid work. Under the second
scenario, child support obligations are adjusted in response to changes
in the father’s income. In this case, enforcement operates like an income
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tax, both reducing the father’s income and the value or price of working
more. Under either scenario, non-resident fathers may also respond to
child support enforcement by trying to evade the government and
taking jobs in the informal economy, by working off the books, or by
becoming self-employed.9
Freeman and Waldfogel use data from the 1986 and 1991 Surveys
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Even though the SIPP is a
large national sample similar to the NSFH, these data include small
numbers of non-resident fathers, particularly small numbers of low-
income fathers and never-married fathers. The data do not identify the
important subset of men who had a child outside of marriage but
subsequently married. Despite the disadvantages of small sample sizes
and some ambiguity in the identification of non-resident fathers, the
combination of SIPP data and information from the Office of Child
Support Enforcement about child support policies and practices provide
a valuable opportunity to examine effects of child support on non-
resident fathers’ labour supply responses.
Freeman and Waldfogel’s main finding is that policies on child
support payments do not reduce non-resident fathers’ labour supply.
There is some chance that the policies will increase labour supply,
particularly for never-married fathers, although these results vary across
samples and so are much less reliable than the main finding of no labour
supply effect. Self-employment or work on casual jobs does not respond
to more rigorous child support policies.  The authors interpret their
findings as evidence that child support obligations do not have an
adverse effect on labour supply for low-income fathers; instead, they
argue that low wage rates are a source of low child support transfers.
Remarriage and New Birth Rates as a Result of Child Support
Enforcement
Critics of strict child support enforcement claim that heavy financial
obligations to children from a previous relationship limit non-resident
fathers’ ability to remarry and father additional children. Because non-
                                          
9 To try to disentangle the effect of child support enforcement on labour supply
from the effects of labour force participation on the ability to pay child
support, Freeman and Waldfogel examine the effect on labour supply of child
support policies across states and over time. By comparing the effects of
policies on the labour supply of non-resident fathers to that for resident
fathers in the same states, Freeman and Waldfogel test the validity of their
conclusions. This strategy addresses the problem that state policies and
labour supply may be determined by the same factors.
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resident fathers who remarry often share their incomes with
stepchildren, strict child support enforcement may transfer money out of
step-family households, thereby helping some children at the expense of
others. David Bloom, Cecilia Conrad, and Cynthia Miller investigate the
effects of child support enforcement on the remarriage rates of non-
resident fathers, and on the likelihood that they will have children in
new marriages. Using data from the SIPP and the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY), this research shows that effective child support
enforcement reduces the likelihood of remarriage for low-income men.
As evidence that these findings are not the result of state differences
which account for both child support policies and remarriage rates, the
papers show that there is no effect of child support enforcement on
remarriage rates for men who did not have children when they
divorced.
Bloom and his colleagues also find that child support enforcement
is unlikely to prevent non-resident fathers from having children in
subsequent marriages, given that the fathers remarry. Enforcement,
however, may reduce the chance that a non-resident father who has
already had one child outside of marriage will have another child out-
of-wedlock. This finding applies to all non-resident fathers, but appears
to be somewhat stronger for low-income non-resident fathers.
As in the other large surveys used to study non-resident fathers,
the NLSY and SIPP data used in the remarriage analysis have small
numbers of non-resident fathers, especially in important subgroups,
such as those with low-incomes or who have had a child out-of-
wedlock. By conducting parallel analyses with data from two sources,
Bloom et al. provide a range of estimates of the likely effects of rigorous
child support enforcement on non-resident fathers’ remarriage.
Although they find reasonably consistent effects of child support
enforcement on remarriage for low-income fathers, they find no effect on
remarriage of the predicted likelihood that individual fathers actually
pay any child support. The difference between the findings for
individual fathers’ behaviour and the findings for the effects of
aggregate-level enforcement variables are attributed to the use of weak
statistical instruments.
Bloom and his colleagues emphasise their finding that a 10%
increase in the collection rate for child support cases will decrease the
annual rate of remarriage by between 3 and 9 percent among low-
income fathers. Building on this estimate, Bloom et al. simulate the effect
of a 10 percent increase in child support collections on the financial gain
to all children, including those who live with remarried mothers. They
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interpret their results as showing that the increase in child support
payments is largely offset by the reduction in remarriage, by which non-
resident fathers share income with their stepchildren. These papers
conclude that the economic benefits of child support enforcement for
children are overstated because they do not take account of the negative
effects of more rigorous enforcement on children in stepfamilies.
Child Support Enforcement and Non-resident Father-Child Relationship
Tradeoffs
Judith Seltzer, Sara McLanahan, and Thomas Hanson also ask how child
support enforcement will affect non-resident fathers’ relationships with
children. They use data from the NSFH to examine the effects of child
support enforcement on the amount of time non-resident fathers spend
with children, on fathers’ influence in child-rearing decisions after
separation, and on the amount of conflict between parents. By increasing
non-resident fathers’ financial investments in children, stricter child
support enforcement may increase fathers’ incentive to spend time with
children and to participate in decisions about their children’s lives. Also,
a father paying support is likely to want to ensure that the mother
spends the support money on the children. However, stricter
enforcement measures -- particularly the automatic withholding of child
support -- takes from fathers the ability to trade child support to the
mother in exchange for visits with their children. As a result of this
change in the bargaining playing field, stricter enforcement may have
the effect of reducing the amount of time the father spends with
children; the mother can count on child support being collected through
withholding whether she facilitates visits or not. Finally, by bringing
more fathers into the system, including those who have dropped out to
avoid conflict with their children’s mother, more rigorous child support
enforcement may increase children’s exposure to high levels of conflict
between their parents.
Seltzer and her colleagues use two strategies to assess the effects of
stricter enforcement on non-resident fathers’ relationships with children.
Like several of the other authors in this section of the book, they take
advantage of state and temporal variation in child support policies to
estimate the effects of child support payments on visiting, taking
account of unmeasured characteristics that may explain both child
support payments and frequency of visits. They also use data from a
longitudinal sample of families observed both before and after a
separation to statistically control for fathers’ income and the quality of
parents’ relationship and the father-child relationship before divorce. By
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taking account of economic resources and the quality of family
relationships, their longitudinal analysis explicitly controls for many of
the other characteristics that might explain both child support and other
aspects of fathers’ involvement with children after separation. Both
analyses rely almost exclusively on information provided by resident
mothers about non-resident fathers’ behaviour, because of the under
representation of non-resident fathers in the NSFH data.
The authors find that fathers who pay support have more
influence in child-rearing decisions, and may see their children more
frequently than fathers who do not pay support. Their findings also
suggest that stricter enforcement of child support obligations is likely to
increase children’s exposure to serious disagreements between parents
of the type that are generally considered to be harmful to children. For
fathers as a whole, paying some support seems to have no effect on
conflict, but when payments increase beyond $2,000 a year, the
incidence of more serious conflict rises.
A Recurring Theme: Differential Impact on Low-Income Non-resident
Fathers
A common finding throughout this section is that more rigorous
enforcement may have a larger effect on the behaviour of low-income
fathers than on fathers with more economic resources. This pattern is
consistent with the more difficult experiences low-income fathers have
in the child support system and the higher percentage of these fathers
who have children out-of-wedlock and are therefore subject to increased
efforts to establish legal paternity, compared to higher-income fathers.
An alternative explanation is that the indicators of child support
enforcement used in the statistical analyses are measured more
appropriately for low- than higher-income fathers. The research
described in this section relies heavily on data about enforcement that
comes from the Office of Child Support Enforcement and other statistics
from IV-D offices. Because these state and federal agencies have
generally focused their efforts on non-resident fathers whose children
are supported by public welfare programmes, the statistics these
agencies use to evaluate their effectiveness are likely to be better
measures of performance among low-income fathers than among all
non-resident fathers even though many child support reforms have
universalistic goals. Conclusions about the relative impact of child
support enforcement on low- and high-income fathers would be
strengthened by improved measures of enforcement for fathers at all
income levels.
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Child Support Enforcement and Non-marital Childbirth Rates
Taking a step back from the question of how child support enforcement
affects non-resident fathers Anne Cases paper asks if enforcement affects
whether men become non-resident fathers at all. Case examines the
effects of child support enforcement on the rate of non-marital
childbearing. She argues that states with low rates of non-marital births
may have certain characteristics that also lead to strict child support
enforcement policies, i.e., a conservative electorate.10 Also, states with
rapidly rising non-marital birth rates may adopt stricter child support
enforcement policies as a reaction to these demographic trends. In either
instance, a study exploring the effects of child support enforcement on
non-marital childbearing must take account of these alternative
explanations. In her paper, Case shows that state child support policies
are a function of changes in states’ economic and demographic
conditions and the political forces at work in the state, including the
proportion of women in state legislatures. She then demonstrates that
even after taking account of the factors that predict state policies, non-
marital childbearing rates are curbed by tougher enforcement policies.
Case’s aggregate-level finding that enforcement may reduce
childbearing outside of marriage is consistent with the individual-level
results reported by Bloom and colleagues on the likely reduction in non-
marital childbearing among fathers who already have one out-of-
wedlock child. Thus, at least some aspects of child support enforcement
are likely to alter men’s fertility, reducing the chance of their becoming
non-resident fathers.
4. Should We Do More to Help Fathers?
The last set of papers address the question of whether we should be
doing more to help fathers meet their obligations. The first two of these
focus on specific demonstrations designed to help fathers who are
denied access to their children and to help poor fathers meet their child
support obligations. The third one uses political and legal theory to
                                          
10 This concern is similar to that addressed in other chapters by using men
without children or resident fathers as a control group to test whether the
effects of child support enforcement affect only non-resident fathers. To the
extent that the enforcement variables affect men not subject to these rules,
other state differences than child support policies account for the association
between child support enforcement and non-resident fathers’ behaviour.
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assess our current policies toward poor fathers and fathers with second
families.
The Question of Access
Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes describe the results of two studies
of programmes designed to improve non-resident parents’ access to
their children. The first study examines court-based programmes in five
different states, and the second evaluates the Child Access
Demonstration Projects funded by the Office of Child Support
Enforcement in 1990 and 1991. Most of the sites in the OCSE
demonstration projects used random assignment.
Parents were eligible for the programmes if they had disputes (or
were at risk of having a dispute) related to visitation or custody or,
sometimes, child support. The majority of children whose parents were
in the access studies -- between 70 percent and 80 percent -- lived with
their mothers. Families who participated in the intervention
programmes had much higher rates of serious conflict and allegations of
domestic violence and substance abuse than parents in the general
population.
Non-resident fathers and resident mothers were equally likely to
report visitation problems. Both reported problems related to unclear
visitation plans, disagreements about scheduling visitation, arguments
that broke out when children were picked up or dropped off, and
problems caused by new relationships. About half of the non-resident
fathers and mothers were also concerned about their child’s safety in the
other parent’s home.
Pearson and Thoennes find that mediation and short-term
counselling were effective ways to resolve conflicts over scheduling
visits. The effectiveness of the programmes depended in part on the
seriousness of the problems between the parents. Among families with
the most problems -- if the non-resident father felt cut out of the child’s
life, for example, or if there was a history of continued fighting between
parents or domestic violence -- the majority of parents did not report
improvements in their relationship. Patterns of continued hostility and
anger were evident for both the treatment and control groups,
suggesting that the passage of time rather than interventions accounts
for the small improvements in parents’ relationships.
The effects of programme participation appear slightly more
positive when success is measured by the amount of post-intervention
contact between children and non-resident parents. Among families
with less entrenched conflict who participated in mediation, non-
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resident fathers reported an increase in their time with children. Fathers
in the control group did not experience this increase. However, among
high-conflict families, there were no differences in subsequent contact
for those who participated in the intervention relative to those who did
not. Programme participation resulted, at best, in a small improvement
in compliance with child support orders. Finally, Pearson and Thoennes
argue that participation in counselling and education programmes at the
early stages of separation and divorce are likely to be more successful in
resolving access problems than participating in programmes designed to
intervene only after serious disputes develop. Although the vast majority
of separating and divorcing parents do not report major problems with
visitation or access, it is possible that more aggressive attempts to
establish paternity for children born outside of marriage will lead to
greater numbers of non-resident fathers needing help gaining access to
their children.
Lessons from the Parents’ Fair Share Demonstration
Earl Johnson and Fred Doolittle describe the Parents’ Fair Share
Demonstration (PFS), a programme designed to increase non-resident
parents’ ability to pay child support to families of children on welfare.
PFS is aimed at assisting non-resident parents who are under- or
unemployed and who have been unable to pay child support. Non-
resident parents, almost always fathers, enter the programme through
the court system. PFS provides employment and training services, and it
helps the fathers obtain temporary reductions in their child support
obligation to enable them to complete the programme. In addition, the
programme provides peer support groups, counselling, assistance in
establishing paternity and child support awards, and, if necessary, help
in arranging formal mediation between the father and the children’s
mother.
The authors draw on in-depth interviews and informal
conversations with approximately thirty non-resident fathers, about
two-thirds of whom are African American, to explore the family
circumstances and attitudes of men in the programme. Although most
fathers in this sample have worked full-time in the past, they are
sporadically employed, if employed at all, when they enter PFS. Because
of their unstable income, they may owe much more child support each
month than they earn. The fathers accrue large arrearages, which they
do not expect ever to be able to pay. A substantial minority of the fathers
do not have a stable residence; they move between friends’ and
relatives’ homes, sleeping on couches or in cars. Johnson and Doolittle
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report that many of these fathers, despite their unstable living
arrangements, manage to maintain some contact with their children. The
father’s mother -- the children’s grandmother -- may be an important
link between the father and his children.
The non-resident fathers in PFS believe that their lack of a good job
and steady employment make it impossible for them to be good fathers.
Their experiences in the child support system teach them that informal
or in-kind payments to their children’s mother mean nothing to the
family courts. Because both the fathers and the children’s mothers
consider child support payments part of a trade for access to children,
fathers without stable incomes have less time with their children.
Fathers also limit their time with children out of shame about their lack
of employment and status. Fathers who are unable to make regular,
formal child support payments realistically believe that they may be
jailed for failure to pay support. When the mothers receive AFDC, men’s
willingness to pay support is further discouraged by the knowledge that
any payments will go to the state, and not directly to their children. The
fathers also feel obligated to contribute whatever money they can to
support the household and children with whom they’re living, instead
of the children from past relationships.
At this point it is too early to judge the effectiveness of the Parent’s
Fair Share Demonstrations. At its most promising, the combination of an
employment and training programme, a Responsible Fatherhood
curriculum, peer support, and temporarily lowered child support orders
offers fathers the potential to change their lives. But clearly, the
challenge is daunting.  Whether the employment and training
component of PFS will be any more successful than previous job training
programmes, such as the National JTPA and JOBSTART, remains to be
seen. The holistic approach of providing both economic and emotional
support to low-income non-resident fathers may, or may not, reduce
their frustration and feelings of powerlessness.
Theories of Justice as Guidelines for Child Support
Martha Minow, a legal theorist, addresses two frequently heard
concerns -- whether indigent non-resident fathers should have small or
no child support obligations and whether non-resident fathers should be
able to reduce their child support orders if they support other children.
Minow considers low-income fathers and children in second families in
the context of other value judgements inherent in state policies
addressing the support of children, such as the state’s obligation to
guarantee all children a minimum standard of living.
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Minow ties parents’ obligation to support children to their
responsibility for bringing children into the world. Yet this rationale
provides no insight into the amount of support beyond basic subsistence
owed to children; nor does it provide a rationale for reducing the
obligations of parents who decide to have more children in a new
relationship. Historically, the state has been reluctant to intervene in
parental support, except in cases of non-marital childbearing or marital
dissolution. In these instances, enforcement of child support obligations
has been motivated by political concern about dependence on public aid.
The goal of reducing dependence provides a framework for exploring
questions about how the child support system should treat poor parents
and children in second families. A second principle to apply to these
contested issues is that parents should share their incomes with children
to a degree that enables children to achieve the same standard of living
that they would enjoy if their parents lived together.
Minow uses these principles to consider four guidelines for
establishing child support orders: income shares, flat percentage,
progressive percentage, and the “Melson” formula. She argues that none
of the guidelines explicitly requires that children’s subsistence needs be
met. Each guideline allows for modifications due to changed
circumstances, such as additional children to support, but the guidelines
do not provide clear rules about accounting for obligations to other
children.
To resolve the question of child support obligations of poor
parents and parents of second families, Minow reviews five normative
theories: utilitarianism, Kantian theories of rights and duties, virtue
ethics, ethics of care and relationships, and expressive models of law.
She concludes that all of the theories are consistent with at least modest
child support responsibilities of poor non-resident parents, although the
ethics of care approach is more equivocal on this point than the other
theories. Minow also argues that theories of justice offer conflicting
guidance on whether to modify child support responsibilities when a
non-resident parent ends up with children in a new family. In her view,
however, the conflicting guidance does not justify allowing judges to use
discretion in difficult cases. She points out that discretion can lead to
inconsistent treatment of similar cases, can limit the extent to which the
message about he importance of providing for children is clear, and can
lead to judgements that reflect the biases of individual judges.
As a result of her analysis, Minow recommends that poor non-
resident parents be required to pay at least a token amount of child
support. She cautions that establishing an obligation that would be
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impossible for parents to pay would be counterproductive, in ways
similar to those identified by fathers participating in the Parents’ Fair
Share Demonstration. Minow especially notes the importance of having
some of the non-resident parent’s child support go directly to the child
instead of to the state to off-set the cost of public support.
On balance, Minow also believes that child support obligations to
children from a first relationship should not be forgiven if a non-resident
parent has children in a subsequent relationship. She points to the
complexity of the issues involved in deciding whether support
obligations to children from the first relationship should be reduced
somewhat to take account of the non-resident parents’ new
responsibilities. Her discussion of the responsibilities of low-income
parents and of obligations to second families argues for more
information about public attitudes and beliefs and about family
behaviour to inform debate about how the law should handle questions
about children’s needs and parents’ competing interests.
5. Conclusions
During the last 25 years, federal and state governments have enacted
increasingly strong legislation to compel non-resident fathers to pay
child support. This legislative thrust has been supported by two research
streams, one depicting the plight of single mothers and their children
and the other documenting the ability of non-resident fathers to pay
substantially more child support. In the popular media, fathers who fail
to pay child support have been labelled deadbeat dads. Child support
enforcement has gained widespread political support because of its
potential both to reduce public welfare expenditures and to improve the
economic security of single mothers and their children.
In this drama, which we have labelled Fathers under Fire, policy
makers and the public have focused primarily on fathers’ ability to pay
child support, with little attention being given to their other
responsibilities and concerns. Moreover, as described in section 2, even
the research on fathers’ ability to pay has often been oversimplified
and/or misinterpreted. Just because non-resident fathers as a whole can
afford to pay substantially more child support than they currently pay
does not mean that the fathers of children on welfare can afford to pay
substantially more. Our paper attempts to redress this imbalance by
focusing explicitly on non-resident fathers and their responses to
stronger child support enforcement.
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We address three major questions: Do child support policies make
sense in light of the characteristics, capabilities, and circumstances of
non-resident fathers? Will stronger enforcement have adverse effects on
these fathers and, ultimately, children? And, finally, should we take
more positive action toward helping fathers meet their child support
obligations and other parental responsibilities? In this concluding
section, we summarise the answers to these questions, point to areas that
merit further research, and provide specific recommendations for
improving the current child support system.
The Questions
Are Policy Developments Compatible with Fathers’ Capabilities?
Child support policy in the last 25 years has been characterised by
increasing stringency and uneven application. Routine withholding of
child support obligations, state-wide registries of obligations, reporting
of new hires, new interstate enforcement mechanisms, seizure of assets,
forfeiture of drivers licenses and professional licenses have made it more
difficult and costly for fathers to avoid paying child support. Because a
large part of the impetus for stronger enforcement has been to reduce
welfare expenditures, however, enforcement has focused
disproportionately on the fathers of children on welfare who are likely
to be poor themselves. Because these men lack legal representation and
political clout, their child support obligations are much higher, relative
to their income, than the obligations of middle income fathers. Finally,
new paternity establishment practices, such as in-hospital paternity
establishment, are bringing increasing numbers of low-income fathers
into the formal child support system.
In view of what we know about fathers capabilities and
circumstances, do these policy developments make sense? The answer is
both yes and no. Stronger child support enforcement as a general policy
makes sense. Harsher treatment of low-income fathers, however, is
perverse and could be dangerous. Non-resident fathers pay about $15
billion in child support . According to the values embodied in current
state child support guidelines, they should be paying $45 to $50 billion.
A large minority of fathers who pay no child support -- between 30%
and 40% according to Garfinkel, McLanahan, and Hanson -- have very
low-incomes. Without help, they will not be able to contribute very
much money. At the same time, an equally large minority of non-paying
fathers can afford to pay substantial amounts of child support.
Furthermore, according to state guidelines, most fathers who are
currently paying child support should be required to pay more. As a
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whole, fathers who live apart from their children have lower incomes
than fathers who live with their biological children. But because non-
resident fathers are less likely to live with dependent children, their
standard of living is somewhat higher than that of resident fathers. More
importantly, their standard of living is much higher than that of their
non-resident children. Finally, Meyer’s research in section 3 shows that
requiring fathers to meet their child support obligations would not
reshuffle poverty from old families to new families. All of this suggests
that stronger child support from non-resident fathers would reduce the
economic insecurity of children and might reduce public costs.
Although the uneven application of child support enforcement is
understandable, even predictable, it still is a matter of concern. The
concern is not that low-income fathers are being brought into the formal
child support system. As we argue below, we think this could be a
healthy development. Rather, the concern is with the disproportionately
high (relative to income) child support obligations imposed on these
men and with the disproportionate use of harsh enforcement tools
against these men. To begin with, there is the simple question of equity.
Few people would say that it is fair or just for low-income fathers to be
treated more severely than well-to-do fathers, including being jailed for
failure to pay child support. Similarly, few people would agree that low-
income fathers should be required to pay half or more of their incomes
when much less is expected of middle- and upper-income fathers.
Besides being unfair, the harsh treatment of low-income fathers is
likely to be ineffective. The cost of collecting child support from these
men is likely to be as great as (or greater than) the total amount of
dollars collected. Twenty percent of all non-resident fathers are
estimated to earn less than $6000 (Meyer). To insist that these men pay
as much child support as a man with a full-time, full year minimum
wage job is unduly onerous. Even worse, expecting these men to
reimburse past AFDC payments to their children over and above their
child support obligations established by state guidelines, is a recipe for
failure. These men simply cannot pay these debts, and no child support
agency can make them do so. The inevitable result, as depicted by
Johnson and Doolittle is the accumulation of child support arrearages,
periodic jailing, and the build up of hostility and resentment toward
mothers and children as well as government authority. As we discuss
below, there may be good reasons for insisting that even very poor
fathers pay some child support. But enforcement of unrealistic and
onerous obligations among these men is not likely to save money and
could do a lot more harm than good.
27
Does Enforcement Have Adverse Unintended Effects?
Strengthening public enforcement of private child support is not likely
to have much adverse effect on the poverty rates of fathers with new
families or on the work behaviour of non-resident fathers. The new laws,
however, are likely to deter out-of-wedlock births. And they may deter
remarriage and increase children’s exposure to serious parental conflict.
These are the major findings reported in section 3 of this paper.
Although none of these results should be taken as the last word on the
subject, they do raise concerns, and they do suggest that there are likely
to be tradeoffs associated with stronger child support enforcement.
Deterring out-of-wedlock births strengthens the case for stronger
enforcement (Case). We are relatively confident in Case’s results since
they have been replicated by other studies (Garfinkel et al, 1998; Plotnick
et al 1998). Similarly, because Freeman and Waldfogel’s findings in
section 3 are similar to those of Klawitter (1994), it does not appear that
child support orders or enforcement reduces non-resident fathers’
labour supply. The results for remarriage and conflict go in the opposite
direction. Indeed if Bloom and his colleagues are correct that most of the
income gains to children of non-resident fathers are offset by income
losses resulting from declines in remarriage, and if Seltzer and her
colleagues are correct that increases in child support payments may lead
to more serious conflict between parents, than stronger enforcement
may make children worse off overall. Because the data Bloom and
colleagues use provide such small samples and because the results
reported by Seltzer and colleagues depend on the sample and analytic
strategy adopted, we hope their work will be replicated by other
researchers. Until the findings are replicated, we believe their results
should be viewed more cautiously. Even if the losses in children’s
income due to declines in remarriage offset the gains in income due to
higher child support payments, other indirect effects, such as the
deterrence effects of child support on divorce (Nixon 1997) and non-
marital childbearing go in the opposite direction. Delays in remarriage
also may reduce children’s exposure to serious conflict. We know that
conflict is relatively common in stepparent families (Hanson,
McLanahan and Thompson, 1996) , and it is possible that delays in
remarriage might result in better matches and less conflict.
All four authors of this paper have advocated stronger child
support enforcement. And the findings about remarriage and conflict
have not persuaded us to abandon our position. What these papers do
suggest, however, is that the indirect effects of child support
enforcement on fathers’ behaviours could turn out to be more important
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than the direct effects. Finally, if the negative effects of child support
enforcement on remarriage are concentrated among low-income fathers,
this reinforces the cautions we raised in the previous section about
overzealous enforcement among poor fathers and fathers of children on
welfare. Overburdening these men and using their payments solely to
reduce welfare costs are two strategies that are likely to increase
negative behavioural responses without increasing children’s economic
security.
Should We Do More to Help Non-resident Fathers?
Last, we consider four strategies for helping non-resident fathers:(1)
helping fathers gain access to their children, (2) providing low-income
fathers with services to improve their earnings capacity and fathering
capabilities (3) reducing or eliminating obligations for very low-income
fathers, (4) reducing obligations for fathers who live with other children.
The first two proposals are examined from an empirical-social science
perspective which asks if interventions are effective. The last two are
assessed from an ethical-theoretical perspective which asks if they are
just.
Helping Fathers Gain Access to Children
Stronger child support enforcement weakens non-resident fathers’
bargaining power vis-à-vis resident mothers and may reduce their
ability to spend time with their child. Under the old system, a father
could trade child support for visitation, whereas under the new system
he is forced to pay, but the mother is not required to reciprocate.
Collective attempts by fathers to redress this imbalance are to be
expected. Pearson and Thoennes (section 4) find that mediation and
other services can increase fathers’ access without increasing serious
conflict, at least among couples who do not have serious, long-standing
disagreements. They recommend that services be provided quickly
before disagreements have had time to become entrenched. In our
judgement, the shift in OCSE policy from a pure enforcement approach
to including services to promote access is an appropriate policy
response. If child support enforcement is to succeed it must be perceived
as fair and balanced. Rights normally go along with responsibilities. This
is consistent with the behaviour of parents in national surveys as well --
when fathers pay child support, this increases their influence in
decisions about the children’s lives (Seltzer et al.). However, because of
the potential harm that violent fathers might inflict on mothers and/or
children, strengthening access must be done with care.
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Helping Fathers To Meet Their Obligations
The preliminary findings from the Parents Fair Share programme as
reported by Johnson and Doolittle (section 4) are discouraging insofar as
they underscore the desperate conditions of many low-income fathers
who are not paying child support. Most troubling is the fact that many
men appear to have come to accept the notion that they are little more
than breadwinner and have withdrawn from their children out of a
sense of failure. Also noteworthy is the fact that many of these fathers
believe that their child support dollars are going to the government
rather than to their children. It is not surprising that these men feel a
greater responsibility toward the children in their current households,
who may not be eligible for welfare, than they feel toward their non-
resident children. These results suggest that, at a minimum, low-income
fathers should not be required to pay a higher a percentage of their
income than middle income fathers. They also suggest that it would be
worthwhile to examine the effects of establishing even lower obligations
for low-income fathers. Similarly, the federal government or state
governments should experiment with incentives for low-income fathers
to pay support and with giving credit for in-kind payments. Although it
is too early to evaluate the success of the Parent’s Fair Share
Demonstration Program, continued experimentation with efforts to
assist low-income fathers to increase their earnings and their interest
and competence in fathering is warranted.
Exempting Very Poor Fathers From Child Support Obligations
A large minority of non-resident fathers are so poor that they can afford,
at most, small to meagre amounts of child support. The costs of
collecting support from these men are likely to be as large or larger than
the amounts collected. However, the fact that extreme poverty is usually
not a permanent phenomenon and the fact that enforcement deters non-
marital childbearing improves the benefit/cost ratio of stronger
enforcement amongst the very poor. Conversely, the fact that the
negative effects of enforcement on remarriage may be concentrated
among low-income parents reduces the benefit/cost ratio.
Perhaps the clearest conclusion that emerges from Minow’s
(section 4) normative analyses is that all fathers, including the very
poorest men, should be required to contribute something toward their
child’s support. Her argument is consistent with the Pearson-Thoenes
suggestion in the same section that setting expectations and resolving
disputes early in the process leads to more co-operation between parents
in the long run. We find these arguments convincing. Even a small child
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support obligation at the beginning may reduce the possibility of future
disagreements about whether the father should pay any support at all.
We also agree that the obligation must be one that is fair and reasonable.
Low-income non-resident fathers should be brought into the formal
child support system, but the system must be reformed. Increasing the
number of low-income fathers who are legally liable for child support
without reducing the harshness of their treatment is likely to result in
substantial harm to children. The fathers will not be able to meet their
obligations; the children will experience no financial gain; and serious
conflict between the parents may increase. Surely this is not good public
policy.
Reducing Obligations in Response to New Dependants
About one third of non-resident fathers live with other children. It is
possible that the percentage would be higher if child support
enforcement was weaker, or if child support obligations were reduced in
the event that non-resident fathers began sharing their income with
other children. Certainly, the circumstances of these fathers would be
improved if child support obligations were reduced, or eliminated, as a
consequence of the new children. However, the position of the non-
resident father can be improved only by worsening the position of his
child and the child’s mother or by increasing the costs to taxpayers.
Moreover, Meyer (section 3) has shown that even without an allowance
for new dependants, there would be very little “reshuffling of poverty”
from fathers’ first family to new families if current child support
legislation were fully enforced. Thus, we agree with Minow’s conclusion
that although normative theories provide no unambiguous answer to
this dilemma, in the end, government should help parents anticipate the
danger of failing to provide for their existing children by sending a clear
signal of “no modification due to subsequent duties.”
Directions for Future Research
The papers reviewed in this paper have done an excellent job of using
existing data and methodologies to answer our questions about non-
resident fathers’ characteristics and reactions to stronger child support
enforcement. They also have highlighted many limitations in our data
and methods. First, and perhaps most importantly, many of our best
surveys undercount or misclassify a substantial proportion of non-
resident fathers, especially low-income fathers and fathers of children
born outside marriage. To draw a truly accurate, as opposed to a
patchwork-portrait of non-resident fathers, we must do a better job of
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including these men in our surveys, and we must do a better job of
persuading the men who are in our surveys to acknowledge their
paternity status. Finally, we must learn more about the missing fathers
by designing special studies that target these men. Getting accurate
information on unwed fathers is particularly important since this group
of men is the fastest growing part of the non-resident fathers population,
and since they are most likely to be underrepresented in our existing
surveys. A particular concern is whether the omission of so many non-
resident fathers from survey samples biases conclusions about the
factors the predict child support and related outcomes, such as
employment, remarriage, and paternal involvement.
Along with bringing more non-resident fathers into our samples,
we need to gather more information about these men from the mothers,
including information on the fathers’ education, occupation, work
history, and marital histories. Such information would help us sort out
which fathers are missing from the data and will allow us to test our
assumptions about assortative mating used in studies which rely on
mothers reports about fathers’ characteristics. We should ask mothers
more questions about their exposure to domestic violence,
distinguishing between experiences with their own fathers (or father
figures), the fathers of their children, and other sexual partners. Asking
questions about the current relationship between the mother and non-
resident fathers seriously underestimates the potential for violence, since
parents who do not get along are less likely to have any contact with one
another (Seltzer, McLanahan, and Hanson). Asking questions about all
past relationships may seriously overestimate the potential abuse of
non-resident fathers since they are only one potential source of violence.
To obtain reliable estimates of exposure to domestic violence and to
address the problems of small samples in section 3 of this paper may
require special sampling strategies and reliance on state-based samples
from vital records. The analyses of national survey data for outcomes,
such as employment, in which reporting bias is probably smaller than
for domestic violence, shows that national surveys without very large
oversamples of important subpopulations do not provide sample sizes
large enough to support the statistical analyses necessary.
We also need to follow fathers over time. Many of the factors that
determine fathers’ ability to pay child support are likely to change as
fathers grow older. For example, fathers’ ability to pay increases with
age (Phillips and Garfinkel, 1993; Lerman and Ooms, 1993 ). Such data
are very expensive, and attrition is always a problem. This is especially
true in studies that attempt to follow fathers after the break-up of a
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marriage or union when residential mobility is very high. The NLSY-
1979 cohort has done a very good job of keeping track of non-resident
fathers, and the new NLSY-1997 cohort will provide an excellent
opportunity for following a new cohort of men who are coming of age in
the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Finally, couple data are essential if we want to understand the
relationship between parents who live apart. While mothers can provide
reasonably accurate information on child support payments and
visitation, they cannot report on the father-child relationship or on many
other aspects of non-resident fathers’ lives. Similarly, fathers cannot
provide good information on mothers’ attitudes and expectations or
mother-child relationships. Even information about the couple’s
relationship is likely to be biased if obtained from only one party. If we
really want to learn how to promote more co-operative relationships
between parents who live apart, we must have information from both
parents and we must collect data from couples rather than individuals.
In addition to highlighting the limitations of existing data, this paper
points to some of the analytical problems that researchers face when
they try to determine how fathers will respond to stronger child support
enforcement. All of the research presented in section 3 confirms that
extrapolating from correlational evidence is likely to yield biased
estimates of fathers’ reactions. To deal with this problem, they treat
cross-state differences in child support laws and practices as “natural”
experiments and argue that estimates based on these experiments are
superior to those based on simple correlations. Anne Case, however,
raises serious questions about this strategy when she shows that cross-
state differences in child support policies may not be random after all.
Her findings imply that researchers need to be cautious in their choice of
“natural” experiments, and they need to test for the robustness of their
results under different assumptions.
All of the all of the inquiries discussed in section 3 should be
replicated by other researchers using other data sets. We see this set of
analyses as a first step toward assessing the effects of stronger child
support enforcement on fathers’ behaviour. Although the results for
non-marital childbearing have been replicated, and the findings on
employment are consistent with some past work, those for other
outcomes – employment, remarriage and father-involvement – need the
scrutiny of further research and replication.
In addition to replicating the analyses in this book and
demonstrating the robustness of the estimates, we encourage researchers
to build models that include multiple indirect effects for fathers (or
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mothers) and examine outcomes across multiple actors. Bloom and his
colleagues have taken a step in this direction by simulating the effects of
fathers’ remarriage on the economic wellbeing of children. In doing so,
they have mapped out a research agenda for the future that is both
ambitious and essential.
Finally, the papers in this survey only begin to address the
question of whether we could (or should) do more to assist non-resident
fathers in meeting their child support obligations. With respect to the
empirical question of whether programmes work, we must wait for the
formal evaluation of Parents Fair Share before drawing conclusions about
this particular programme. In addition to these demonstrations,
fatherhood initiatives are springing up throughout the country with
different emphases and different clientele. New and better data on
fathers can inform these new initiatives by highlighting the areas where
fathers need the most help. The next generation of initiatives will
provide numerous opportunities for evaluating the effectiveness of
programmes designed to help fathers meet their paternal obligations.
Similarly, the access demonstrations examined here represent only a
small part of a larger set of initiatives designed to reduce conflict and
increase co-operation between parents. Parent education programmes
and mediation for divorcing couples have gained widespread support in
some parts of the country, and these efforts need to be described and
carefully evaluated in terms of both their effectiveness and costs. (Emery
1994) Conflict resolution among low-income parents is a particularly
important topic for future research, given that the new welfare
legislation pushes unmarried parents toward more contact and greater
interdependence.
Social scientists cannot answer the question of whether we should
do more for non-resident fathers. The best we can do is to provide
information to policy makers and citizens on whether a policy is
effective and how benefits and costs are distributed across different
groups -- fathers, mothers, children and taxpayers. This book was
motivated by a concern that fathers’ interests were being neglected by
social scientists in the assessment of child support policies. But we do
not mean to imply that fathers’ interests should take precedence over
those of mothers and children. In order to be complete, the evidence in
this book must be combined with research on the effects of stronger
enforcement on mothers and children and these, in term, must be
balanced against the costs to tax payers of different interventions.
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Policy Recommendations
As is always the case in a research endeavour, many questions remain
unanswered. But policy cannot wait until knowledge is perfect. A
number of policy recommendations are more or less implicit in the
previous paragraphs on future research directions. We now turn to
making these recommendations explicit. We distinguish between two
types of policies -- those that affect families who are already separated
either due to marital disruption or because they have children born
outside of marriage, and those that affect families who will experience
marital disruption or bear out-of-wedlock children in the future. That is,
we consider both policies that affect the stock of families in which non-
resident fathers and children are already living apart as well as the flow
of families into the child support system. The distinction between these
families is important, because families already in the child support
system or who are already separated have established expectations
about how the parents will deal with each other. Changing the “rules”
midstream may increase conflict and dissatisfaction among parents.
Introducing new rules before parents decide to live apart means that
their decision to separate is made in the context of clear rules and
expectations about each parents’ rights and responsibilities to children.
Although most of our recommendations apply to both the stock and
flow of new families into the child support system, limited
organisational or personnel resource limitations often mean that changes
are applied first to new cases. Our recommendations about access,
however, make theoretical as well as practical distinctions between the
stock and flow of child-support eligible families.
A Universal Enforcement System
In principle, the American child support enforcement system is
universal, offering similar services to all who request them, irrespective
of income or welfare status. In practice, however, many state
enforcement offices provide only limited or no services to mothers and
children not on welfare. Furthermore, many fathers who are unwed or
extremely poor escape the system entirely. In our judgement, the system
should be universal. As we have argued above, even very poor fathers
should be required to pay a token amount of child support. At the same
time, pursuing only fathers of children on welfare is neither fair nor
wise. Many children of middle-class fathers also receive inadequate or
irregular support. Some of the mothers of these children receive no help
from state child support agencies and are forced to hire a lawyer and
take the father to court in order to obtain what they are owed. Lacking
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the time and money to effectively pursue the father, many mothers
simply give up and forego the support they are due. Dealing with these
claims on a case by case basis is inefficient and should be redressed.
Other mothers not on welfare may have initially believed that they did
not need collection services from the child support agency, only to find
that over time payments became irregular or stopped. While services
should be available to all families who request them when having
difficulties, a policy that sought to provide services to all from the
outset, might prevent this type of scenario. Society has an interest in
assuring that all non-resident fathers support their children.
Special Treatment of Low-income Fathers
At the very least, child support enforcement policy should not treat low-
income fathers worse than middle- and upper-income non-resident
fathers. Two practices are especially onerous -- making low-income
fathers liable for repaying welfare costs and assuming that they earn at
least the full-time equivalent of the minimum wage. Such practices,
which lead to large arrearages and small payments, should be abolished.
Child support guidelines should also be amended to insure that
low-income fathers are required to pay no higher a fraction of their
income in child support than middle- and upper-income fathers.
Consideration should be given to requiring fathers with incomes below
the poverty line to pay an even lower proportion of their income in child
support.
Consideration also should be given to expressing child support
orders in percentage terms. Expressing orders in percentage terms
would provide automatic relief to the minority of fathers who have
temporarily low-income. Fathers who experience an income loss due to
unemployment or illness are not in a position to go to court to seek a
reduction in their child support orders. Thus, expressing orders in
percentage terms would also help prevent the accrual of large
arrearages. At the same time, because most fathers’ incomes go up over
time, expressing orders in percentage terms would lead to larger child
support orders and payments in the vast majority of cases (Bartfeld and
Garfinkel 1996).11
                                          
11 Percentage-expressed orders do have some disadvantages. One difficulty is
that child support enforcement workers do not know if the amount of child
support that was paid in a particular case was the correct amount unless they
know income. Similarly, if a non-resident parent’s income falls to zero, no
child support is due, but without knowing income, a child support
enforcement worker does not know if a payment is appropriate or if an
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Child support policy should go beyond eliminating unrealistic and
unduly onerous child support obligations for low-income fathers to
providing them with incentives and assistance to meet their child
support obligations. Further experimentation with programmes like
Parent’s Fair Share should be undertaken. Under PRWORA, states are
allowed to eliminate the $50 child support pass-through to mothers and
children on welfare and most have done so. The federal government, or,
failing that, individual states should reverse this policy and reinstate the
pass-through. For instance, the state of Wisconsin is now giving 100% of
child support paid to all (except a small experimental group of) welfare
recipients in the state. It is important for fathers to know that their
children derive some benefit from their child support payments. Even
more important, we should reward mothers and fathers who establish
private child support obligations by guaranteeing that children receive a
minimum amount of support every month (Garfinkel 1994). This would
encourage both paternity establishment and child support orders.
Finally, we should experiment with programmes that match very low
private child support payments with public funds – something akin to
the Earned Income Tax Credit which subsidises earnings. This policy
would encourage very poor fathers to pay support and would also
increase the economic security of poor children.
Policies to Promote Non-resident Father’s Access
We believe that fathers have a right to see their children, but we do not
believe that there should be a direct policy link between child support
and access. That is, we believe that non-payment is not a valid reason for
a resident parent to deny access, nor do we believe that denial of access
is a valid reason for non-payment. Both payments and access are highly
contested and unreliable, so to link the two would increase the chances
of both breaking down. Children would be held hostage to their parents’
                                                                                                                                  
enforcement action should be taken. Some simple steps could make the
administration of these percentage-expressed orders easier: Non-resident
parents could be required to provide the child support agency with their tax
returns so that the amount of child support paid could be reconciled with
annual income, or non-resident parents could be asked to report loss of
income to the child support agency.  A second difficulty is that percentage-
expressed orders are difficult to administer in states whose guidelines
consider the resident parent’s income as well as the non-resident parent’s.
Nonetheless, we believe the advantages of percentage-expressed orders
outweigh their disadvantages, and would like to see them used more
extensively and evaluated more rigorously.
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disagreements as they were in the past, prior to the new child support
legislation. Evidence from the demonstration projects Pearson and
Thoennes (section 4) review supports our pessimism about attempts to
enforce access in families with long-term conflicts about child support or
access.
Nonetheless, we believe there is an imbalance of policy, in which
child support obligations are publicly enforced, but access is not.
Policymakers attempting to enforce access face the difficulty that fathers
without access come from two types of families: Some non-resident
fathers seek greater access than resident mothers may permit. In other
families, fathers themselves avoid access even though resident mothers
may prefer non-resident fathers to spend more time with their children
(e.g. see Bruch, 1978 and Czapanskiy 1989 for proposals to increase
financial obligations of non-resident parents when they fail to spend
regular time with their children). Ascertaining whether the mother or
father is acting irresponsibly in a particular case is no easy matter.
Furthermore, the possibility of spouse or child abuse compounds the
difficulties. Thus, we believe we must proceed cautiously,
experimenting first with early education, mediation and other services
before trying bold new initiatives to enforce access.
We believe that the best hope to increase access of fathers from
both types of families is to work toward establishing new expectations
about access and child support so that both mothers and fathers start off
with a better understanding of what the others’ rights are. This is a
longer-term strategy than most of our other policy recommendations. It
focuses attention on families in which parents are in the process of
deciding to live apart. We suspect that revised parental expectations is
one reason Pearson and Thoennes find that access problems decrease
when a visitation schedule is established early in the separation period
before serious conflict becomes entrenched. This long-term strategy is
also consistent with Seltzer’s (1998) argument that joint legal custody
increases non-resident fathers’ contact with children because it clarifies
that both parents have the right to participate in children’s lives after
divorce.
Private and Public Child Support
This book is about non-resident fathers and child support policy.
Although we have attempted to approach the policy issues primarily
from the non-resident father’s point of view, it is obvious that child
support policy must also take account of the interests of children,
resident mothers, and society as a whole. And our recommendations
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reflect these other interests. Similarly, just as child support policy should
not be shaped by only one set of interests, it must be considered in light
of a broader social policies affecting families and children.
At the most general level, child support policy reflects the extent to
which the support of children is a private rather than a public
responsibility. Some people take the position that child support
enforcement is unnecessary because the costs of child rearing are a
public responsibility. They argue that if public benefits were more
generous, children would not need private child support. We do not
share this position, and we would point out that no country has totally
socialised the costs of children. Hence, not enforcing private child
support obligations implicitly means shifting more of the costs of
children onto resident mothers. The public responsibility argument, in
practice, becomes a smoke screen for excusing non-resident fathers from
their responsibilities.
Other people take the position that the support of children is
purely a private responsibility. We do not agree with this position either.
To begin with, society has an interest in making sure that children’s
basic needs are met. This means, at a minimum, that government has a
responsibility to enforce private child support obligations. Even more
important, just as the need for private child support enforcement would
not evaporate if we had a better public income maintenance system,
even a perfectly efficient private child support enforcement system
would not obviate the need for better income maintenance, public
education, healthcare, and child care. In short, we see these two systems
-- public and private support for children – as complementing one
another, and as reinforcing the social norm that raising healthy and
secure children is a shared responsibility.
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